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Abstract 
Today the European welfare states are strongly challenged and it is heavily debated how much 
social security a society should provide and how much private insurance is possible. This article 
goes back to the origins of the German welfare state. In the 1830s, industrialists from the district 
of Aachen (Prussian Rhineprovince) suggested to implement collective labour rules regulating 
working hours and wages. In the 1860s – 20 years before Bismarck – they proposed a mandatory 
pension system with equal contributions of employers and employees; they suggested labour 
conflict resolution by joint arbitration panels of employers and labour representatives. The pro-
posals did not gain support from the Prussian ministries arguing collective agreements would 
violate freedom of contracting. 
Entrepreneurs demanding social welfare and the Prussian state defending economic liberalism – 
this challenges the perception of the Bismarckian welfare state as a means to reconcile labour 
with the German state. Yet, in the early 19th century the district of Aachen was the most ad-
vanced economic region in Prussia in regard with industrial employment and modern industrial 
organisation. Producing quality goods for the world markets, the industrialists aimed at stabiliz-
ing the social environment and reconciling labour with the capitalist society. Their motivation, 
however, was not based on philanthropy; it was guided by economic aims and collective self-
interest. Analysing ‘social policy’ as a capitalist aim, the paper puts the German welfare state in a 
new perspective. By doing this it also wants to contribute to the discussion on the future of the 
modern welfare states, because if the argument presented here holds it might have implications 
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Why did early industrial capitalists suggest  
minimum wages and social insurance? 
1. Introduction. Discussion of literature 
In 1850 the city of Aachen in the west of the Prussian Rhine province was situated in a 
densely populated industrial region with a majority of the workforce working in relatively 
large factories and mines (chapter 2). In the early 1830s, labour conflicts and a social up-
heaval in the city of Aachen suggested local industrialists and the chamber of commerce 
to propose collective labour agreements (on working hours, labour contracts, etc.). The 
proposed regulations did not materialize because the Prussian Government did not want 
to interfere with private contracting. In the 1860s, the same groups of people proposed a 
pension scheme for old workers with equal contributions from employers, workers, and 
the city government making factory work more attractive and better accommodate the 
working class with the capitalist society. The proposals indicate the changing work envi-
ronment, the development of competitive labour markets, and the social change in this 
formative period of industrial capitalism. The suggestions indicate that the industrial dis-
trict of Aachen was ahead of the national developments; some 20 years before the Ger-
man State and chancellor Bismarck implemented social security for factory workers in 
the 1880s, similar ideas had not only been discussed by industrial capitalists, they even 
demanded institutions mitigating negative impacts of industrialization and societal 
change. Their main concern was to legitimize the capitalist order.1 
This observation is somehow at odds with the conventional view of the emergence of the 
German ‘Welfare State’.2 The literature argues that both the Prussian health funds 
(‘Unterstützungskassen’) of the 1850s and the compulsory insurance of the 1880s are 
legally and chronologically connected to the decline of the guilds.3 Despite research on 
welfare discussions in the 1840s and 1850s4 it is generally assumed that the social insur-
ance legislation of the 1880s (compulsory insurance for industrial workers against sick-
                                                     
1
  For a first tentative discussion see Reckendrees, 2010: 72-80. 
2
  Hennock, 2007; Ritter, 1983: 17-130 provide two relevant overviews. 
3
  Hennock, 2007: 331; Kuhnle and Sander, 2010: 67. 
4  See Reulecke, 1983 on the Centralverein für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen. 
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ness, 1883; accidents, 1884; old age and invalidity, 1889) had been top down decisions; 
the “Bismarckian” system is interpreted as an ‘attempt to build worker loyalty towards 
the imperial regime after having repressed the freedom of organization, assembly, and 
expression of a growing, radical socialist movement and party’ and a ‘contribution to 
state and nation-building’5. Bismarck’s political strategy is described aiming at reconciling 
the labour movement with the newly established German State on the one hand, and a 
‘carrots and sticks’ policy against the socialist movement on the other hand.6 The inter-
pretation is mainly based on the royal message of 17 November 1881, the main sections 
of which were edited by Bismarck; it argued that ‘the redress of social problems is not 
simply to be sought by repressing the Social Democratic excess, but equally by positively 
promoting worker’s welfare’.7 
With this paper I want to contribute to the discussion about the origins of social welfare 
in Germany. I am not rejecting the major interpretation as there is good reason to con-
nect the German welfare state to Bismarck’s policy, because the implementation of 
compulsory insurance required decisions by the Government, the King and the Parlia-
ment. Yet, this view seems too simplistic for two reasons: (1) Recent archival research 
presented in an eight volume collection illustrates that, before 1881, there was no ‘mas-
ter plan’; social security policy emerged without a clear strategy – but it followed specific 
aims. Going back to the early 1860s the documentation illustrates the changing ap-
proaches of Bismarck, the Prussian Ministries, and political interest groups.8 (2) Own re-
search on the development of early capitalism in the first decades of the 19th century 
indicates that industrialists well aware of existing and potential social conflict discussed 
engaged the prospects of the emerging capitalist society. Based on economic self-
interest, rather than on philanthropic ideals, they developed ideas of how to socially in-
tegrate society. And they thus contributed to the slow process of institutional change. Of 
course, the industrialists of Aachen did not have the political power to implement new 
institutions; they did, however, propose the implementation of factory rules with mini-
mum standards (1830s), old-age insurance and an arbitration panel for work conflicts 
                                                     
5
  Kuhnle and Sander, 2010: 65. 
6
  Tenfelde, 2001. 
7
  Tennstedt, 1981, the quote follows the citation in Ritter, 1983: 33. 
8
  See the edition by Henning and Tennstedt, 1990-2006. 
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(1860s). The proposed argument is not that the ideas have already been developed be-
fore Bismarck; it is rather that existing tensions within the emerging capitalist society in 
the industrial provinces of Prussia induced the demand for social welfare and security. In 
the perspective of the elites, the stability of society was dependent on social integration 
of the labour class. While the argument fits well to the idea that Bismarck wanted to 
conciliate labour with the state, it takes a different angle. 
The argumentation combines not yet elaborated theories of social conflict to explain the 
welfare state and theories of institutional change and collective action. 
It follows a brief description of the regional economy and its institutional arrangements. 
The major incident of a revolt in the city of Aachen (1830) and the industrial response to 
this uproar is analysed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 briefly presents a contradicting view, and 
in chapter 5 the proposal of an old-age insurance system in the 1860s is interpreted in 
the context of a changing economic environment. 
2. The industrial region of Aachen and its institutional arrangements 
In the first half of the 19th century, the region of Aachen (Appendix: maps 1 and 2) was a 
dynamic industrial district with modern economic institutions and advanced industrial 
organization. It is a good example for the regional rather than national dimension of 
European industrialisation.9 On the territory of the German states the region of Aachen 
was pioneering; based on pre-industrial production systems, an industrial district with 
modern factory production in many sectors developed: Within two decades artisan and 
putting-out industries, particularly woollen cloth, transformed to modern industries pro-
ducing in large scale factories operating machines and power engines. In 1830, the large 
‘clothiers’ in Aachen, Burtscheid, Düren, and Eupen operated vertically integrated firms. 
Power machines drove all kind of machines (scribbling, carding, spinning, napping or rais-
ing, shearing, fulling, pressing).10 Coal mining and iron and steel industrialised rapidly. 
New industries related to increased industrial demand (machinery or railway wagons) or 
to raw materials (zinc) emerged in the 1820s and 1830s. At about 1850 also the indus-
tries of lead, glass, paper, and needles produced in large scale factories. In 1861, ap-
                                                     
9 
 Pollard, 1981: 45-219. 
10 
 Reckendrees, 2006: 19-30. 
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proximately 2/3 of the districts labour force was working in manufacturing and mining; 
50% of them in “large” factories with more than 100 employees (Appendix: tables 1 and 
2).11 
Within the regions new industries, the first industrial joint-stock companies in Prussia 
were established; Aachen was home to an important insurance company and bank 
(Aachener und Münchener Feuerversicherungs Actiengesellschaft, see below); and one of 
the first German railways connected Cologne and Aachen with Liége and Antwerp.12 Re-
gional industrialists re-invested profits, diversified risks, and cooperated in these new 
joint-stock companies.13 An important feature of the regional production system was 
knowledge transfer between firms and branches. Nevertheless, firms and industries con-
tinued to compete on product markets and on the markets for labour and capital. Thus, 
the regional economy was shaped by competition together with cooperation and recip-
rocal interconnections of entrepreneurs, firms, and branches.  
The institutional arrangements of the Rhine province were partly based on French law; 
on the left bank of the river Rhine not the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht, rather the 
Napoleonic law with its ‘five books’ (code civile; code de procédure civile; code de com-
merce; code d’instruction criminelle; code penal) constituted the legal norms.14 With the 
Revolutionary Wars the region of Aachen had become the Département de la Roer. After 
the French defeat in 1814, when the Rhineland became Prussian the French legal system 
and property rights supportive to economic development continued to constitute the 
norms of economic activity (with only few exceptions). The substitution for new Prussian 
laws was slow; and new Prussian laws did not dramatically influence regional economic 
development; only few had a certain impact and they were inspired by French ideas.15 
The Prussian integration of the Rhineland had, of course, economically relevant aspects 
                                                     
11 
 Reckendrees, 2010: 63; data from 1861. 
12
  According to the original plan the railway should pass by Aachen some 15km in the North but due to the 
strong industry and the effective lobbying of the Chamber of Commerce Aachen succeeded to attract the 
railway to the city. 
13
  Reckendrees, 2012b.  
14 
 On the legal institutions in the Rhine province and the continuation of French law in the western part of 
Prussia see: Conrad, 1969; Faber, 1970; Fehrenbach, 1974; Schubert, 1977; Bernert, 1982; Strauch, 
1982. 
15
  On the impact of the 1843 law on joint stock companies see Reckendrees, 2012b. 
  
 
Reckendrees: Why did early industrial capitalists suggest minimum wages and social insurance   6 
(e.g. the single Prussian currency and the Prussian tariff union); they are however not 
relevant for the purpose of this article. Economic history surprisingly has not yet systemi-
cally used the existence of two legal systems within the Prussian state for generating or 
testing hypotheses on the economic impact of legal systems.16 
Other institutions of French origin have been equally important for the regional pattern 
of economic development, especially self-regulating collaborative institutions17 like the 
Chamber of Commerce of Aachen (1804), Commercial Court (1805), and Trade Court 
(1808). The Chamber of Commerce had administrative functions in the Prussian state 
(providing information on regional industry, trade, and commerce to the Prussian minis-
tries – and ministerial information to the local industry); it is, however, important that 
the chamber consisted of elected industrialists.18 The limited archival material indicates 
that the chamber fulfilled a double function in that it complied with its administrative 
tasks and also acted as the political representation of industrial interests towards the 
local Royal Government of Aachen and the ministries in Berlin; respective activities are 
for example documented in regard to the Rhenish railway or to tariff questions.19 The 
Commercial Court (‘Handelsgericht’, existing until 1879)20 and the Trade Court (‘Conseils 
de prud'hommes’, ‘Gewerbegericht’)21 were elected by representatives of commerce, 
trade and industry. The Commercial Court smoothed or decided on conflicts between 
firms and between merchants, the Trade Court decided on labour related conflicts. Both 
were relatively flexible instruments within the only slowly changing civil law system. The 
Commercial Court and the Chamber of Commerce explicitly highlighted this quality in 
letters to the Royal Government of Aachen: 
                                                     
16
  For an overview of the discussion, see Mahoney, 2001; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; La Porta et al., 2007. 
First steps in Acemoglu et al., 2011, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012. 
17 
 Reckendrees, 2010. 
18
  ‘Chambre consultatives de manufacture, fabriques, arts et métiers’, see: Thomes, 2004: 20-33, Zeyss, 
1907. 
19
  Reckendrees, 2010: 56-58. 
20
  Zeyss, 1907: 1-18; Bernert, 1982: 126-128, 144.  
21
  Bernert, 1982 (after 1846 ‘Königliches Gewerbegericht’); there are differences between the Trade Court 
in Aachen and the Factory Courts established in the 1840s (Bernert, 1982, 147), which fulfilled similar 
functions: Willoweit, 1982; Schöttler, 1985; Mieck, 1997. 
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‘In a region so full of commerce and factories […] the normal courts are not suffi-
ciently prepared to arbitrate the thousands of conflicts of merchants as in many 
cases there is no written law on the details, or to decide according to the civil 
law.’ Economic development was always ahead of the legal development and 
the regional economy would need a legal system ‘as simple as merchant con-
tracts and as effective and quick as permanently active speculators are.’ 22 
In the early 19th century, judicial practice in trade and commerce was thus partly based 
on case decisions, which gives in a certain way support to the legal-origins hypothesis in 
the economics of law literature claiming that common law systems were more suppor-
tive to economic change and growth than civil law systems. Yet, it does also challenge 
the persistent view that civil law systems, like the French and the Prussian, were inflexi-
ble; a much deeper analysis of practices seems to be necessary.23 
The briefly presented institutions shaped an environment that allowed for the articula-
tion of diverging interests; they could perhaps not always be mitigated but they were at 
least negotiated. Such constellations are supposed to contribute to the emergence of 
trust-based relationships and more stable institutional environments.24 They were sup-
ported by exclusive bourgeois societies like the Club Aachener Casino (founded in 1805) 
where industrialists, merchants, members of the local administration, and their families 
met. It was not only a social meeting point for arranged marriages, but also a forum of 
information exchange (the club had for example an own library with national and inter-
national newspapers).25 
Despite of ‘modern’ institutions the relationship between capital and labour did not 
modernize accordingly. In the first decades of the 19th century the employers had been in 
a superior position due to liberal labour contracting, prohibition of coalitions, bourgeois 
class justice, and an oversupply of labour. Incidents of workers destroying new machin-
                                                     
22 
 States Archives Düsseldorf (HSAD) Reg. Aachen 1606: Letter of the local judges to President von Re-
iman, Aachen, 19.4.1816. The Chamber of Commerce supported the judges, letter 18.5.1816, ibid. 
23
  Reckendrees, 2010; Mahoney, 2001; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; La Porta et al., 2007. 
24
  On the importance of networks for trust in institutions see e.g.: Granovetter, 1985.  
25
  Arens and Janssen, 1937 u. Sobania, 1991. More generally see the literature on business ethics and the 
values of the bourgeoisie in the 18th and 19th century, e.g. McCloskey, 2006. 
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ery such as the Luddite revolts in England were few (in Eupen 1820),26 yet in the 1830s 
industrial relations started to change. The employers’ strategic position was challenged 
by growing poverty, unemployment, and frustration of impoverished artisans, especially 
in the industrial cities of Aachen and Eupen. Their respective activities first aimed at fac-
tory regulations, then arbitration of labour conflicts, and finally mandatory pension 
schemes.  
3. The revolt of 1830 and the reaction of employers and the bourgeois society 
In August 1830, a local conflict between the owner of a cloth factory and some of his 
employees escalated into a revolt in the city of Aachen in which about 4.000 people par-
ticipated. The workers accused the employer of high-handedly wage shortages and the 
employer, who argued the workers hadn’t worked properly, expelled the protestors from 
the factory. A small group of people now standing and shouting in the courtyard at-
tracted a growing audience, especially of very young and unemployed people. When two 
policemen were called to dissolve the demonstration the problems increased because 
the crowd repelled the policemen. Encouraged by an experience of ‘power’ – and per-
haps also by the news of the Belgish revolution – the increasing group moved to other 
places in the city. The object of desire was a capitalist symbol: the house of the wealthi-
est inhabitant of Aachen, James Cockerill, owner of coal mines and capitalist ‘rentier’, 
who from the workers perspective did not work but rather went to horse races and was 
nevertheless incredibly rich.27 Cockerill’s house was plundered, the wine cellar emptied, 
valuable furniture and paintings destroyed, the piano was thrown out of the window. The 
euphoric crowd now went to the local prison, banished the guards and liberated the in-
mates. Yet, in the meantime the city elites had formed an armed brigade. Threading to 
shoot people it finally aborted the revolt, which had already petered out slowly; many 
were back home or celebrating in the local pubs. 
                                                     
26
  Spehr, 2000; Henkel and Taubert, 1979; Minke, 1986; Hermanns, 1982. 
27
  His brother, John Cockerill, had established the largest European iron and steel works and rolling mills in 
Seraing; Jaquemin, 1878, Mahaim, 1905, Lotz, 1920; Hodges, 1960, Fremdling, 1981, Pasleau, 1993. 
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In the following year, 72 people were sentenced to jail with mostly lifelong penalty. A 
detailed report of the event and the trial would make an interesting story on its own, yet 
not the event rather the industrialists’ reactions are further discussed. 28 
Regulation of labour contracts 
Within only a few weeks after the incident, the Chamber of Commerce and the Trade 
Court discussed the situation and solutions that should help avoiding or at least contain-
ing potential labour conflicts; and they presented their suggestions to the Royal Govern-
ment in Aachen. Surprisingly, they did not conclude on more suppression or on stronger 
police forces. Instead already in September 1830, the Trade Court proposed factory regu-
lation, which received support by local industrialists and the Royal Government of 
Aachen.29 Based on its experience with labour conflicts, the Trade Court regarded many 
of the workers’ complaints as justified: Workers had been employed too irregularly; 
wages had been too low and the truck system had too often been used. It would thus be 
necessary to find ‘instruments’ or rules helping to reduce potential conflicts and safe-
guarding a fair treatment of the workers. The precarious situation would demand social 
concessions and labour rights precisely defined. Presently ‘the factory worker is not able 
to feed his family, which raises a spirit of discontentment that should be carefully 
avoided’.30 The Chamber of Commerce supported this interpretation and demanded a 
legal instruction for mandatory factory rules. In modern terms, the Chamber suggested 
solving the free-rider problem by formal institutions. It argued regulation was necessary 
because proper behaving firms should not be disadvantaged, and it asked the Prussian 
Ministry of the Interior to decree a compulsory factory regulation for the Rhine province. 
Each factory owner should be obliged to set up factory rules to be accepted and, if nec-
essary, to be changed by the Trade Court.  
The minimum requirements of these rules should be (1) the abolishment of wage deduc-
tions, (2) the abolishment of payment in commodities, (3) the negotiation and arbitration 
                                                     
28
  The riot is described in detail by Althammer, 2002: 177-202; Volkmann, 1973; Düwell, 1983; Bock, 
1980; Bock, 1990; Bock, 1994; and in a contemporary description of the following trial in Cologne, 
Venedey, 1831. The interpretations, however, differ. 
29
  On the following, with a different interpretation see also Althammer, 2002, 274f. 
30
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of labour conflicts at the Trade Court, (4) a 14 day’s announcement of changes in wages. 
Violations of these agreements should be severely penalized.31 
In fact, this meant the introduction of basic collective labour contracts instead of day la-
bour (spot-labour markets). To modern (European) people the proposal may not seem to 
be revolutionary; yet the suggestions of the industrialists of Aachen did not find support 
in the Prussian Ministries in Berlin. While the Ministry of the Interior for Commerce and 
Trade and the Royal Government in Aachen were sympathetic with the proposed regula-
tions, the Ministry of Justice that was in charge of all legal and responsible for administra-
tive regulations, did not want to interfere with liberal contracting. For three years the 
initiative was crunched in inter-ministerial debates and finally the Minister of Justice suc-
ceeded and rejected the proposal.32 The provided arguments demonstrate how far lib-
eral thought was embraced by the ministry; e.g. in regard to commodity payments the 
Ministry of Justice argued that the factory owner had either employed the worker on the 
condition of commodity payments or that he had not. In both cases the worker would 
have a free choice and could either decline or accept the job: ‘There is no need for prohi-
bition’. It did not assume asymmetric power and rejected the argument of the Chamber 
of Commerce the factory owner could put pressure on the worker by announcing dis-
missal. The Ministry responded it was ‘impossible to take this weapon [the thread of dis-
missal] from the factory owner, but his own interest was the most save and natural re-
striction of its use’. A factory worker must decide on his own whether a contract was in 
his interest. A disadvantageous contract should ‘induce the worker to cancel the contract 
as soon as he is able to use his forces in a more beneficial way’.33  
Two decades later, the Prussian Gewerbeordnung (Trade Law) generally prohibited 
commodity payments. It had taken more than fifteen years of petitions from Rhenish 
industrialists, supported by the Royal Government of Aachen, the President of the Rhine 
                                                     
31
  HSAD Reg. Aachen 1625: Chamber of Commerce to Royal Government, Aachen 29.9.1830, folio 6. 
32
  Secret Prussian States Archives, Berlin (GStA PK) I. HA Rep. 120 Abt. BB VII 3 Nr. 4 Bd. 1, docu-
ments the inter-ministerial debate. 
33
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province, and finally the Rhenish Landtag (the ‘Parliament’), who repeatedly complained 
about misuses.34 
The Aachen Chamber of Commerce and the Royal Government of Aachen had hoped for 
the implementation of mandatory factory rules; they were, of course, not pleased with 
the Prussian Government’s rejection. The number of factories and of factory workers had 
so much increased that potential singular conflict between workers and employers 
threatened to infect also other companies and to expand to societal level.35 Especially 
the local policy tried to calm down labour conflicts; in order to be able to do so the Royal 
Government of Aachen had changed the police rules that now e.g. stipulated that the 
police must be informed before mass dismissals.36 At least one case is documented, in 
which the police successfully mitigated the conflict. When in September 1836 the ma-
chinery factory Dobbs & Nellessen sacked 120 of their 300 workers, a group of workers in 
a nightly attack on the factory wanted to burn it down. However, the police did not only 
react in terms of protecting public order, it also organized new jobs. Within three days it 
arranged jobs for almost 50% of the dismissed in neighbouring factories in Aachen and 
Eschweiler, while Belgian migrant workers were pushed off to Belgium.37 
These events indicate a certain collective industrial approach aiming (1) at containing 
potential labour conflicts, regulating employers’ behaviour, and panellizing misbehav-
iour, and (2) at collective solutions for mass dismissals (or mass unemployment). The 
industrialists reflected the need of industrial relations corresponding to modern indus-
trial production. Their (articulated) aim was not philanthropic,38 it was rather creating 
those social institutions they thought the industrial mode of production required. Some-
                                                     
34
  Anton, 1891; Wischermann and Nieberding, 2004: 144-145; Wischermann does not consider the specif-
ics legal situation in the west of the Rhineland. 
35
  The average size of a cloth factory in 1850 was about 300 workers; statistics are not fully reliable and 
partly contradicting; comprehensive data are available for 1849: Reckendrees, 2006: 33; HSAD BR 
2116-48: Table on the productive establishments and factories of all kind in the district of Aachen for 
1849, folio 319pp. 
36
  HSAD Reg. Aachen 1625: District President to the local government, Aachen, 12.10.1836, folio 35. 
37
  HSAD Reg. Aachen 1625: Summary of the events by police director Lüdemann, 19.9.1836, folio 36. See 
also with a conflicting interpretation, Althammer, 2002, 376f. 
38 
 For a more philanthropic association that had also strong ideas about a good and just society see the 
‘Centralverein für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen‘ founded in 1844 (Central association for the well-
being of the labour classes); Reulecke, 1983. 
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how, this interpretation corresponds to the structure of the Prussian inter-ministerial 
conflict: the Minister of the Interior, very familiar with the advanced industry in the highly 
developed Rhineland, supported the reform ideas; the Minister of Justice, however, was 
mainly concerned with the agrarian provinces in the east of Prussia. 
Programmes to increase savings 
Social problems had been present before the revolt in Aachen; a major incident had been 
the hunger crisis in 1816/17.39 Yet such problems were tried to resolve by charity organi-
sations like ‘Kornvereine’, distributing bread and rye among the suffering. The challenges 
of production demanded however new approaches. One example is the establishment of 
a savings bank some years after the revolt in Aachen and its specific programme aiming 
at the working class. 
In 1825, the fire insurance Aachener Feuerversicherungs-Gesellschaft (Fire-Insurance, 
Inc.) was incorporated. More than 90% of the initial shareholders came from the re-
gion.40 In order to be incorporated by the Prussian authorities as a joint stock company, 
50% of insurance’s net-income (after reserves had been accumulated) had to be spent on 
public purposes. The fire insurance in Aachen explicitly aimed at the working classes. It 
financed among others the worker’s cultural education and it established a kindergarten 
for female factory workers.41 The main purpose, however, was a savings bank: Aachener 
Verein zur Beförderung der Arbeitsamkeit (‘Society for the encouragement of industri-
ousness’) established four years after the revolt in 1834.42  
The savings bank was not only a financial institution but also an instrument to integrate 
the working class into the capitalist system, which from the perspective of farsighted 
capitalists depended on social systems safeguarding the worker from the risks of wage 
labour. The savings bank’s provisional committee wrote in 1833 that most industrial 
workers would not have other means of income than wage labour; they would not have 
                                                     
39
  See Bass, 1991; Bass, 1994; Abel, 1974. 
40
  HSAD BA 16058: List of shareholders, folio 42ff.; on the early years of the insurance see: without au-
thor, 1925; Seyffart, 1827; Masius, 1846: 116-124; Hansemann, 1834; Berndt, 1884; Aachener Verein 
zur Beförderung der Arbeitsamkeit, 1909. 
41
  For more details and literature see Reckendrees, 2012b; Reckendrees, 2010: 75-77; statutes in GStA PK 
I. HA Rep. 120 D XXII 9, vol. 4. 
42
  On the history of the bank see Pohl, 1999; Thomes, 1999. 
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a small garden or subsistence agriculture. Savings should allow for overcoming individual 
crisis like unemployment or illness. Thus, the savings bank provided the ‘labouring popu-
lation’ financial precaution against (un-)expected risks by offering high interest rates. 
Savings accounts were subsidized by the funds from the net-profits of the insurance and 
interest rates were thus high and attractive to those who had almost no means of saving. 
Yet, the bank made high interest rates dependent on well behaviour; it explicitly de-
manded ‘industriousness, order, and well conduct’.43 Continuous saving over three years 
and accumulating 20 Prussian Thaler (corresponding to an average labour income of 50 
days) should give three Thaler premium. With its ideas, the bank was extraordinary suc-
cessful. It advanced to the largest Prussian savings bank at the time with 11,500 savings 
accounts in 1849. 30% of the savers had 50 Thaler and more on their accounts (corre-
sponding to an average labour income of three months); the number of accounts, the 
participation of working class people, and the average amount savings on the accounts 
were far above Prussian average.44 
The bank, on the one hand, was aiming at social security for industrial workers; a savings 
account should provide at least few means to cope with illness or unemployment. The 
previous means of the agrarian society (agricultural side income, fruits and vegetables 
from the garden) were not available to factory workers. On the other hand, the bank 
aimed a socially disciplining and educating the ‘labouring population’. For this purpose 
the fire insurance’s shareholders contributed a substantial amount of the insurance’s 
income. The bank followed the traditional principle of charity and, at the same time, it 
encouraged individual precautions against temporary urgencies like inability to work or 
unemployment. The establishment of the savings bank and the means that it used reflect 
the dramatic change of ‘work’ coming with concentrated industrial production no longer 
allowing for subsistence agriculture. It also indicates that farsighted industrialists were 
aware of the need of ‘insurance’ against the risks of wage labour and of moderating the 
existential problems of unemployment and illness. 
                                                     
43
  HSAD RA 16058: Executive committee of the Aachener Feuerversicherungs-Gesellschaft as a provi-
sional committee of the Verein zur Beförderung der Arbeitsamkeit (Pastor, Hansemann, Seyffart), 
25.10.1833.  
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  Statistisches Bureau zu Berlin, 1851ff. (data 1849), vol. IV 1853, 486ff. Average savings were approx. 
40% higher than in other Prussian savings banks (1861: 94, 98, 103). 
  
 
Reckendrees: Why did early industrial capitalists suggest minimum wages and social insurance   14 
Early health ‘insurance’  
An elementary risk of industrial labour was labour accidents and illness. When the fac-
tory system expanded, the traditional system of poor relief was not supplemented by 
new systems of social security. Guild-based institutions such as mutual relief funds of-
fered ‘insurance’ for artisans or travelling journeymen and they continued to exist; some 
coal mines and some factories had established mutual health funds on factory level 
(‘Fabrikunterstützungskassen’).45 But these instruments were not yet comprehensive. In 
the 1830s and 1850s health insurance became mandatory, first in the region’s coal mines 
and then in the metal industries. In this case, state authorities were the driving force. 
Before the 1830s, workforce had been easily available: Coal miners mainly consisted of 
small farmers working in the mines in fall and winter after harvest was brought in; addi-
tional labourers came from adjunct regions.46 The district’s iron and steel industry was 
still small; the zinc industry did not yet exist; and the early implementation of new ma-
chinery in the cloth industry had set free huge parts of the workforce. There was thus no 
labour shortage until the 1830s. Population increase, migration from the rural hinterland, 
and temporary cross-border migration from Limburg or Belgium provided sufficient sup-
ply.  
With increasing industrial production, from the 1830s onwards and more dramatically in 
the 1850s, labour market conditions changed dramatically. Factory workers were not 
covered by traditional health institutions; and ‘insurance’ became a regular means to 
attract labour. The case of coal mining is illustrative: There were two neighbouring min-
ing districts in the region of Aachen, the Inde and the Wurm revier. Since the turn of the 
century, a mutual miners’ health fund (‘Knappschaft’) existed in the Inde revier.47 In or-
der to compete for workforce, the mines in the Wurm revier had to provide ‘insurance’, 
too. Yet the small number of workers of a single mine did not allow for an insurance 
                                                     
45
  For the 1820s, relief funds are mentioned for the cloth factory of Nellessen (Venedey, 1831, 54f., 119) 
and for a needle factory (Lingens, 1922, 74). A further relief fund is mentioned for the machinery factory 
Dobbs & Nellessen, HSAD RA 1605: Zusammenfassung der Ereignisse durch Polizei-Direktor Lüde-
mann, 19.6.1836, 35; Schainberg, 2004/1997, 293. 
46
  Reckendrees, 2012a. 
47
  Under the Prussian mining law ‘Knappschaften’ had been mandatory, but the mines on Inde and Wurm 
operated under French law (Reckendrees, 2013, forthcoming; Simons, 1890). 
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scheme and it was difficult for the employers to agree on a common system. Their atti-
tude only changed after a serious mining disaster in 1834 with 63 miners killed. Now, the 
mining authorities were able to conclude an agreement with all mines on providing ‘in-
surance’ including medical treatment, help to injured miners not able to work, and basic 
pensions to widows and orphans of miners killed in accidents.48 In reaction to this and to 
increased competition for labour due to new heavy industrial production sites on top of 
the coal fields (iron and steel, zinc industry) and due to the Rhenish railway offering new 
jobs, the Inde mines started to provide also housing for some of its workers.49  
Basic health insurance on the factory level (‘Unterstützungskassen’) was extended by the 
authorities in the 1850s to other large industries, especially iron and steel and metals.50 
The Aachen Chamber of Commerce, however, opposed to compulsory health insurance 
on the factory level, as well as it opposed to the abolition of child labour implemented in 
Prussia in 1839. 
4. Conflicting views  
In her excellent dissertation ‘Authority, Charity, Protest’ Beate Althammer compares the 
two textile cities of Aachen and Barcelona in the 19th century, she argues that the elites’ 
approach to charity (and social policy) did not substantially change between 1830 and 
1870. From her perspective, the Chamber of Commerce’s rejection of compulsory health 
insurance on the factory level and the abolition of child labour, as well as the practices of 
factory owners and the city government did not show a new impetus regarding social 
policy.51 
The argument presented here is different. The industrialists did not share a common 
view on social security; and their changing attitude does not so much show up in prac-
tices rather in discourse and in proposals for new regulation. Compulsory social security 
schemes were dependent on the state implementing new formal institutions; if not, the 
problem of free-riders that was explicitly addressed already in 1830 was to create too 
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  Reckendrees, 2010: 71-72. 
49
  Reckendrees, 2012a: 57, 92, 128, 138-42, 152; Reckendrees, 2010: 79.  
50
  Hennock, 2007; Wischermann and Nieberding, 2004: 100; Puppke, 1966. 
51
  Althammer, 2002: 432f.  
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many problems. – In general, the industrialists’ approach changed after the economic 
crisis of 1857. With increased production and new factories competition for labour dra-
matically increased; and the ideas of the 1830s were reanimated. The main focus was 
now on mandatory pension schemes. They did not become more charitable, rather more 
socially inclusive. The respective suggestions of the Chamber of Commerce, the collective 
industrial voice, were motivated by anticipated social conflict and by the aim of conciliat-
ing labour with the capitalist society. Its proposals regarded (1) an arbitration panel for 
the resolution of labour conflicts with equal representation of employers and workers 
(‘paritätische Schiedskommissionen’), and (2) a compulsory worker’s pension scheme 
(‘paritätische Arbeiter-Rentencasse’) with equal contributions from employers and work-
ers. Furthermore, the Chamber now explicitly welcomed compulsory health insurance on 
the factory level.52 
There seem to be three major reasons for the new proposals: Shortages on the labour 
market; the expected abolition of the prohibition labour coalitions and strikes53; and the 
increasing need to tackle the ever growing social problems. Like in the 1830s, the repre-
sentation of industrialists from the region of Aachen proposed new social institutions and 
regulation that would improve the integration of workers into the industrial capitalist 
society, while the Prussian State saw only limited need for action. – It needs to be men-
tioned that in 1863 Bismarck asked the local Royal Governments about their opinion 
about a pension scheme for workers based on private insurance. Most of them rejected, 
and also Bismarck withdrew his ideas until the early 1880s.54 
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  Handelskammer für Aachen und Burtscheid, 1853ff., especially the reports of the 1860s. Althammer, 
2002: 436 mentions, but does not interpret the changing approach. 
53
  They had been prohibited in the French code de penal, confirmed by the Prussian commercial law (1845; 
§§ 181, 182). The discussion about the prohibition started in 1861 when Saxony allowed labour coali-
tions, in the North-West German Union they were allowed from 1869 onwards, in the Kaiserreich from 
1872. 
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5. A compulsory pension scheme and an arbitration panel for labour conflicts 
The pension scheme55 
In the 1860s the Aachen Chamber of Commerce several times proposed the implementa-
tion of a workers’ pension scheme in order to secure the ‘livelihood of the worker in his 
incapacitated age’. The Chamber explained its proposal with unequal social chances: 
there was a ‘disparity between the factory owner who –based on his activity– is looking 
forward to a carefree future, and the worker enjoying a very restricted autonomy only in 
years of full labour capability, while his fate was unprotected in his incapacitated age’, 
because the worker would not voluntarily save during his best years. This problem was 
regarded so crucial that the Chamber demanded a compulsory (capital based) pension 
scheme to which employers and workers, so the proposal of 1863/64, should equally 
contribute. In the new proposal of 1865/66 three parties should equally contribute to the 
scheme: (1) employers ‘who extensively profited from labour force’, (2) workers, who 
would then receive a pension rather than poor relief, and (3) the cities, who indirectly 
profited from local expenditures of wages and transfer incomes. The state should provide 
a certain amount of seed capital for the pension scheme. 
The Chamber gave several reasons for a pension scheme, one of which was the price 
formation for labour. If ‘the price of labour –just like any commodity– only depends on 
supply and demand or on the business cycle of the factories, the worker would, in case of 
lack of demand, finally be forced to starve or to live on charity’, legal regulations would 
thus be necessary. It is interesting that the industrialist argued based on a Ricardian (or 
Marxian) labour theory of value, however, for the argument presented here it is more 
relevant that they understood that in a modern industrial economy with wage labour, 
additional income (e.g. from subsistence agriculture) had become less and less impor-
tant. Wages must now allow for a livelong reproduction of labour force and also for a 
basic old-age ‘income’. Wanting to guarantee that labour income was used for this pur-
pose, they wished to collect and save the respective contributions within a legally binding 
framework. 
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  All quotes from: Königliches Statistisches Bureau, 1861ff.; 1864: 25, and 1866: 30ff. The source collec-
tion by Henning and Tennstedt, 1990-2006 provides some printed sources that will be used for a revised 
version as well as further archival documentation from the Prussian State Archives. 
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The proposal of a compulsory pension scheme was a reaction to increasing competition 
for labour that required establishing long-term relationships between employers and 
workers, the local industrialists also wanted to bound workers to the city they were living 
in. Up until the late 1850s the city of Aachen had absorbed labour from the surrounding 
towns and from the hinterland; since then the iron and steel industry, coal mining, the 
zinc industry and other new industries in the neighbouring towns increased the regional 
demand for labour and especially the heavy industries paid very competitive wages. So-
cial security seemed thus like a kind of compensation for lower wages and should help 
binding workers to their factories and towns.56 However, the proposal clearly aimed at 
securing the social order: with this institution, the Chamber argued, the worker should 
‘continue to be a useful, individual property respecting member of society until the end of 
his life’. 
The arbitration panel for labour conflicts57 
The second proposal of the Chamber of Commerce followed a similar argumentation. It 
shows that it had not forgotten its proposals from 1830, and that it had further devel-
oped its understanding of industrial relations. The proposal concerned an arbitration 
panel for labour conflicts with an equal number of workers representatives and factory 
owners. The arbitration panel should reconcile ‘the differences between factory owners 
and workers with the help of direct and friendly agreement’. 30 years earlier the Trade 
Court dominated by factory owners was regarded the conflict settling authority. Now, 
the Chamber suggested a parity of the two parties.  
The arbitration panel should not only deal with labour conflicts, it should also prevent 
them and develop rules very similar to modern collective labour agreements. It should 
define the ‘minimum level of labour prices’ and ‘the length of the working day’, it should 
furthermore be empowered to penalize those violating the rules. The Chamber’s radical 
proposal (workers coalitions were still illegal) used rhetoric of social partnership. The 
background of the proposal was the expected abolition of the prohibition of labour coali-
                                                     
56
  Industrial production in the Aachen region continuously increased since the 1840s, demand for labour 
continued to be high and long-time unemployment was probably not known. Reliable data for this as-
sumption is not available, but an extraordinary low level of emigration provides support to this hypothe-
sis; data: 1860. 
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  See quote no. 54. 
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tions and strikes, but the wish for stable industrial relations, long term labour contracts, 
and the integration of labour into capitalist society were of major importance. The 
worker would ‘accept the decisions of the commission, in which he felt equally repre-
sented and this will improve [social] moral’. The rhetoric of social partnership was further 
motivated by the need to convey the work ethics that quality work required: The worker 
would have an own interest in the quality of his work and the competitiveness of the 
factories because this would ‘increase the value of labour’ and help providing a secure 
livelihood. In the future, industry was dependent ‘on producing goods of undoubted qual-
ity instead of cheap products’. In the 1860s this required motivated and qualified labour 
whose cooperation the factory owners wanted to be sure of. 
6. Discussion 
The proposed regulation of industrial and social relations focused on issues of which fac-
tory owners and capitalists thought they would limit potential social conflict and would 
also be beneficial to their collective competitive situation. They were less interested in, 
or could not agree on, formal education, training on the job, or other means improving 
‘human capital’. And, they were not at all philanthropists; the Chamber of Commerce 
continued rejecting mandatory schooling and prohibition of child labour.58 
The Bismarckian welfare system that emerged in the 1880s aimed at building ‘worker 
loyalty towards the imperial regime after having repressed the freedom of organization, 
assembly, and expression of a growing, radical socialist movement and party’.59 Bismarck 
explicitly argued: ‘Whoever has a pension to look forward to in his old age is much more 
concerned and more easily taken care of than the man who has no prospect of any […] if 
we […] safeguard the future of our workers, whose insecurity is the main course of the 
hatred for the state, we [guarantee] our own future.’60 His political strategy is described 
aiming at reconciling the labour movement with the newly established German State on 
the one hand, and a ‘carrots and sticks’ policy against the socialist movement on the 
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  Königliches Statistisches Bureau, 1861ff. Vergleichende Übersicht des Jahres 1865, 29. 
59
  Kuhnle and Sander, 2010: 65. 
60  
Bismarck to Moritz Busch, 21.1.1881. 
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other hand.61 The rhetoric of Bismarck, who started his career in the Royal Government 
of Aachen in 1836 and who was well aware of the situation in the industrial city and pos-
sible also connected to the local industrial elites, and the rhetoric of the Chamber of 
Commerce are remarkably similar if one substitutes the German State for capitalist soci-
ety. But the individual background is rather a curiosity than an argument. 
The proposals of the regional industrialists represented by the Chamber of Commerce 
and the Trade Court indicate that the developed industrial society of the mid 19th century 
in the district of Aachen, and very profane industrialist self-interest originated the ideas 
of rudimental social security for elderly, something similar to collective labour contracts, 
and ideas of social partnership in order to allow for the unhindered and continuous re-
production of the capitalist order. Industrialists in Aachen did not –like their counterparts 
in the UK– restrict relationship to workers to the individual shop floor; they rather looked 
for collective solutions to the problem. How this can be explained in more detail is still 
open for debate. It seems as if cooperative institutions (Chamber of Commerce, Trade 
Court, and Commercial Court) helped developing those ideas; they were daily exposed to 
the challenges of the industrial society and they had to think beyond the individual firm. 
Regional industrialists furthermore engaged in joint activities in new industries (forming 
joint stock companies in insurance, coal mining, iron and steel, zinc, railways, and glass 
industry), which might have contributed to the propensity to collective arrangements.62 
The major explanation for the industrialists proposals are however to be found in the 
industrially advanced region with factory owners and workers living close to each other 
in a densely populated city, who had experienced a dramatic social revolt. Uproar as in 
1830 was to be avoided to happen again. 
The argument developed relates the emergence of the German welfare state to the so-
cietal challenges of industrial capitalism. It does not reject, it rather supplements the 
traditional view of the German welfare state. The creation of the idea of workers welfare, 
yet, required industrial capitalism, not the Prussian State. Still, the implementation of the 
new institutions was impossible without state legislation. 
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Map 1: Prussia. Administrative districts 1850 
 
Source: IEG maps 
Map 2: Industrial district of Aachen, counties with a majority of industrial employment 
 

















I.  Agriculture 1,7% 18,9% 36,8% 18,1% 41,8% 44,1% 32,3%
II. Industry 66,8% 68,9% 52,6% 70,2% 48,4% 49,8% 52,9%
III. Services 31,5% 12,2% 10,6% 11,7% 9,8% 6,1% 14,8%
Industrial workforce 22.893 21.761 13.465 7.470 4.108 8.164 77.861 103.525
Population 59.941 52.855 58.840 23.750 20.386 40.234 256.006 458.746
Note:  mining is calculated as part of “industry”. Four agricultural counties are not mentioned. 
Population includes non working population. 
Sources: own calculation from (Reinick, 1865-1867: vol. I, 152pp.). 
Table 2: Employment in select industries. Administrative district of Aachen, 1861 
A. Handicraft, local markets 22.983 27,1%
B. Factory related weavers, journeymen, apprentices 10.534 12,4%
C. "Industry" 51.393 60,5%
 Employees in total (including management) 84.910 100,0%
I. Mining 9.856  
 Coal mining 4.951 # 5,8%
 Lead ore mining 3.084 # 3,6%
 Zinc ore mining 777 # 0,9%
 Iron ore mining 823 # 1,0%
II. Metal production 4.028  
 Iron works 818 # 1,0%
 Bar iron/steel factories 1.914 # 2,3%
 Zinc industry 561 # 0,7%
 Lead industry 412 # 0,5%
III. Spinning 4.242  
 Woollen yarn 3.285 # 3,9%
IV. Weaving 13.541  
 Woollen cloth industry (vertically integrated) 12.528 # 14,8%
V. Bleaching, dye works etc. 495 0,6%
VI. Metal products 6.139  
 Needles industry 2.151 # 2,5%
 Iron goods 1.890 # 2,2%
 Machine industry 955 # 1,1%
 Iron foundries 302 # 0,4%
 Railway wagon industry 394 # 0,5%
 Carding industry 236 # 0,3%
VI. Minerals 6.152  
 Coke 199 # 0,2%
 Glass industry 362 # 0,4%
 Mirror glass factory 463 # 0,5%
VIII. Processing of plants and animals for trade 2.533  
IX. Wooden goods, paper, dry goods 1.742  
 Paper factories 1.567 # 1,8%
X. "Foodstuff" 2.292  
 Tobacco factories 1.246 # 1,5%
XI. different trades 373  
# = large industries and factory production    
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